United States Multinational Corporations:
The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment
on United States Foreign Relations

CLARKE N. ELLIS*

INTRODUCTION

That multinational corporations (MNCs) have an impact on a
nation's foreign relations is an assertion of which there is very little
doubt. The world's media in recent years have been filled with examples, frequently emphasizing the cases where the impact has
been a negative one. At the same time, relatively little serious
study has been done on the specific ways in which these dynamic
entities affect U.S. foreign relations. One scholar who has examined the question, Professor Dennis M. Ray, lists three avenues of
influence by which MNCs can affect foreign policy:
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-their capacity to take independent action in the international
arena through foreign investment;
-their direct and indirect influence on foreign policy decisionmaking; and
-their capacity to shape public opinion in such a way as to
legitimize governmental action in favor of business interests
abroad.'
This paper will focus on the first of these avenues of influence.

It is, then, a study of the effects of INCs on foreign policy through
their economic activities, rather than through their ability to influence the makers of foreign policy, either directly or indirectly
through the manipulation of public opinion. The recent Congressional hearings into the extent to which International Telephone
& Telegraph (ITT) attempted to influence U.S. policies with regard
to Chile is a good indication of the controversy that is likely to be
associated with any study of the last two means by which an AMC
may affect foreign policy. Admittedly, drawing a line between
economic activities and the lobbying efforts which inevitably accompany them is a difficult task at best.
This paper first provides a definition of MJNCs and gives an idea
of the scope of foreign direct investment (FDI). Next, the economic and political impact of FDI on both the United States (home
country) and the host countries is examined. National perceptions of the economic and political effects of FDI are, in turn, important determinants of the foreign investment policies of host
countries and the United States, and these policies are briefly discussed. The interaction of these sometimes complementary, sometimes conflicting foreign investment policies demonstrates the impact of FDI on U.S. foreign relations. The conclusion suggests that
the ability of MNCs to effect foreign policy through FDI may require some modification of specific U.S. policies affecting foreign
investment.
THE SCOPE OF FOREIGN INvESTMNT BY U.S. MNCs
The absence of any generally accepted definition of MNCs is always a problem. This paper defines these dynamic entities in
terms of their capability to shift production and resources between
different countries and their potential for internationalizing management and corporate outlook. Because this paper is principally
concerned with the foreign investment activities of U.S. MINCS,
1. Ray, Corporationsand American Foreign Relations, 403 A~mALs 83
(1972).
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data covering total American FDI 2 is used as an approximation of
these activities.
Changes in the size, composition, and geographical distribution
of U.S. FDI can be relevant to its effects on our foreign relations.
Table I, infra, illustrates the rapid growth of U.S. FDI during the
period from 1950-1970, and compares the growth of U.S. FDI with
that of trade, GNP, and the investment of other nations in this
country. U.S. foreign investment continues to grow and preliminary figures for year-end 1972 place the book value of our worldwide FDI at approximately $94 billion.
Table II, infra, shows the changes in the composition and geographical distribution of U.S. FDI since 1929.

Tim

EcoNomic IMPACT OF FOnEiGN DMECT INVESTMENT

The case for allowing unrestricted FDI parallels the arguments
for free trade: the free flow of capital and technology, as well as
the free exchange of goods, is believed to result in a more efficient
allocation of the world's resources and an improvement in world
economic welfare. 3 While impressive, this argument does not say
anything about how the economic gains will be distributed. If the
gains appear to flow more to the United States than to the host
country, or to certain groups within either country and not to others, potential problems lurk for U.S. foreign relations.
Host Country Economic Effects
Host country concern over the economic effects of FDI is closely
related to the motives of foreign investors in deciding to locate
abroad. Stephen Hymer has pointed out that a foreign enterprise,
in order to overcome the presumed innate disadvantages of not
2. The U.S. Department of Commerce defines "foreign direct investment" as a relationship in which "... the U.S. ownership is 10 percent or
more when directly, or 25 percent or more when indirectly and directly
held . . . ." U.S. DEPT. or COMMERcE, SPEcIAL SuRVEY or U.S. MuLTINATIONAL COmPANIES, 1970, at 15 (1972).
3. Theoretically, the only strictly economic argument for restricting
international flows of capital and technology is the argument for an optimal capital tax, analagous to that for an optimal tariff. See Johnson,
The Efficiency and Welfare Implications of the International Corporation,
THE INTmNA

ONAL

CORPORATON

43-44 (1970)

(hereinafter Johnson).

being a local firm, must bring with it some offsetting asset. 4 Examples of such assets are new technology, access to capital, management skills, an international marketing network, or merely a
differentiated product.
The basic economic concern of a host country regarding FDI is
thus its assessment of the extent to which the investing firm will
be able to appropriate the potential profits associated with its control over some specialized knowledge. If the return on this knowledge is entirely absorbed by the investor, and product and factor
prices remain unchanged, there is no direct benefit to the host
economy except to the extent that the host government is able to
tax these profits.5
If, on the other hand, the foreign investor is not able to appropriate the return completely, there can be significant "spillover"
benefits to the host country. These benefits can 'accrue to labor in
the form of higher real wages and expanded employment; to consumers by way of lower prices; to local resource owners in the form
of rents; to domestic entrepreneurs through induced investment
opportunities (i.e., forward and backward linkages), and to government through increased royalties and taxes. There may be additional external economies from the non-monetary transfer of technology, marketing information and management skills, introduction of new products, and training of local labor.
Recipient countries naturally want to know the extent to which
these potential economic benefits from FDI exist. Specifically,
they want to know:
--whether the resources transferred are appropriate to host country needs; and, if so, whether they could have been obtained
in another manner at a lower cost;
-what the impact of any "spillover" effects of FDI will be on
the domestic economy; and
-what effect FDI is likely to have on their balance of payments.

Appropriateness and Cost of Technology
Economists from less developed countries (LDCs) sometimes
complain that foreign investors use capital-intensive production
processes unsuited to their labor-abundant economies, and that
considerable useful technology can be had at little or no cost
through foreign assistance programs and academic exchanges. It
is a fact that Japan was, until recently, able to base much of its
4. See the discussion in KIUMLEBRGER,
at 390-91.
5. Johnson, supra note 3, at 45.
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rapid growth on "second hand" technology acquired through
licensing agreements and simple imitation of foreign products
rather than reliance on FDI.6 Yet, as Japan is now discovering,
much advanced technology often is only available through FDI.
Effects on Domestic Economy
The potential revenue benefit to the host government has already been mentioned. The effect on competition in the host country economy is more difficult to estimate. If a host country industry is oligopolistic, the entry of a foreign investor may provide a
beneficial increase in competition. On the other hand, it has been
alleged that if the challenge of the foreign investor is too great,
it may stifle the development of a local entrepreneurial class and
7
result in a more or less permanent state of economic dependency.
Of particular relevance to the LDCs is the effect of MNC operations on income distribution. If foreign investment is concentrated
in a small, relatively capital-intensive sector, such as is frequently
the case in raw materials extraction, a small elite class of skilled
workers, managers, local business partners, and government officials may be strengthened. In such cases where FDI has few linkages with the rest of the economy, income inequalities may be increased, unless offset by host government policies.8
Comparatively little empirical work has been done to date to try
to measure the extent of "spillover" benefits to the host economy.
Studies by several economists, however, do tend to indicate that
these effects are positive. 9
Balance of Payments Effects
It is generally recognized that the initial inflow of capital will
have a favorable effect on the host country balance of payments.
6. Yoshino, Japan as Host to the InternationalCorporation,THE hqm

-

NATIONAL ComuonTi TrON
350-53 (1970).

7. Sunkel, Big Business and cDependencia," a Latin American View,
3 FOREIGN AFFAiRs L.J. 518, 527-29 (1972).
8. VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY 184-85 (1971).

9. See, e.g., Caves, Benefits to Host Countries from Foreign Investment,
Discussion Paper Number 294, Harvard Institute of Economic Research,
Harvard University, 1973. In addition, studies by John Dunning and
Donald Brash found that the presence of U.S. MNCs had resulted in increased competition in British and Australian industries respectively.

At the same time, it is contended by some LDC economists that
since the reverse flow of repatriated dividends, earnings, interest
and royalties in any year usually exceeds the inflow of new capital, FDI is actually decapitalizing their countries. Such arguments
fail to take into consideration positive effects of FDI on the host
country balance of payments that may result from increased exports or import substitution. Yet, if the host country suffers from
low resource mobility or follows suboptimal economic policies (e.g.,
an overvalued exchange rate and/or high tariffs), the host country
may indeed experience a deterioration in its payments balance associated with FDI.
Empirical work on the balance of payments effects of FDI has
produced results both pro and con from the host country standpoint. A recent study on the economic impact of MNCs by the
U.S. Tariff Commission found that the balance of payments effects
of U.S. MNCs in manufacturing varied from country to country,
but produced an overall deterioration in the balance of payments
of the rest of the world with the United States.10 Other studies
have indicated results more favorable to individual host countries,
and it would seem almost self-evident that FDI has made an important balance of payments contribution to raw material exporting countries such as Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Nigeria.
Economic Effects of FDI on the U.S.
In the United States there has been considerable acceptance of
the view that FDI produces a "win-win" situation economically for
both the sending and receiving countries. In recent years, however,
doubts have been expressed, particularly by organized labor, as to
the economic benefits accruing to the U.S. from FDI. Charges are
made that MNCs are "runaway industries" which export American
jobs and technical know-how to "cheap labor" countries and that
present tax laws reduce the potential benefit of FDI to the U.S.
Treasury. These accusations are embodied in the Burke-Hartke
trade bill currently before the Congress.
While it has by no means settled the argument, the Tariff Commission study provides evidence that the overall economic effects of
FDI on the U.S. economy are positive." Specifically, the Commission found that:
10. U.S. TARIFF ComM'N, IhMrPcATIONs
WORLD TRADE AND INVESTMENT AND FOR U.S.
11. Id. at 1-14.

or MuLmwNATIONAL FMMs FoR
TRADE AND LABOR 26-27 (1973).
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-the larger American direct investors have tended to be sources
of increased U.S. exports;
-American FDI produced a modest net increase in our domestic
employment, under what it considered to be the most realistic
set of assumptions regarding what might have happened had
the U.S. investor not gone abroad;
-American M1NCs have made a positive contribution to the overall U.S. balance of payments (although not with that of every
country); and
-American FDI has not played a role in narrowing the U.S. comparative advantage in a number of high technology fields.
The Tariff Commission study, of course, does not mean that FDI
may not have adverse effects on particular sectors of the economy,

as policy makers are frequently made well aware.
Effect on the International Economic System
Both sending and receiving countries have an interest in the impact of FDI on the international monetary and trading relations.
It is widely believed that the operations of MNCs frequently promote economic integration, both within a single country and in
regional groupings such as the European Community. Less bound
by a parochial national outlook than their continental competitors,
U.S. MNCs have been effective in exploiting the enlarged market
offered by the European Community. 12 In Latin America, the
role of the MNC in increasing economic interdependence between
nations is evident in the various complementation agreements. Under these accords, several governments, at the request of M1NCs or
a trade association, will agree to free trade in certain products. In
return, the VINCs arrange their production programs in each participating country so that they will be complementary rather than
competitive, to those in the others.
U.S.-based MNCs are an important element in the total world
trading picture but do not dominate it. The Tariff Commission
study found that while the MNC share of world trade increased
by 2 percent between 1966 and 1970, they still only accounted
for 23 percent of total world exports of over $300 billion in the latter year.13 Thus, fears that world trade is rapidly becoming intra12. Terpstra, Americans in the E.E.C.: Bane or Boon? 19 MlcH. Bus.

REV. 25-27 (1967).

13. See note 10, supra, at 278.

company transfers-and subject to greater manipulation than
arm's length transactions between independent buyers and sellers
-appear for the present to be exaggerated.
The ability of MNCs to shift funds rapidly from one currency
to another has a major impact on the international monetary 'and
investment policies of the United States and other countries. Of
the estimated $268 billion in short-term assets held by the principal
public and private institutions in international money markets at
the end of 1971, the Tariff Commission study found that about $171
billion or 64 percent was in the hands of foreign affiliates of U.S.
corporations or foreign branches of U.S. banks. The $171 billion
in short-term international money market 'assets held by instrumentalities of U.S. MNCs is considerably larger than total world
monetary reserves and is virtually uncontrolled by governmental
authorities anywhere. Only a small fraction of the funds available
to U.S. MNCs and the other participants in the international money
market need move in order for a genuine monetary crisis to develop. Undoubtedly, currency movements by M-NCs have been a
significant element in the recurrent dollar crises which have
plagued the international monetary system since 1971. (Corporate
treasurers have the responsibility to protect the firms' assets.)
Against this negative factor must be balanced the important creative role of U.S. MNCs in the development of the international
money market. 14 The long-term solution lies probably not in the
investment area, but in the establishment of the kind of international monetary order where destabilizing capital movements
are no longer necessary.
THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

The political impact of FDI results from the fact that it is undertaken by firms which, by definition, operate under the jurisdiction
of more than one national state. The unique characteristics of
MNCs noted earlier-the capability to shift productive operations
between different countries and a potential for internationalization of corporate outlook-have given rise to widespread feelings
that these firms pose a threat to the full exercise of national sovereignty. While such sentiments probably underestimate the power
of the nation state to regulate economic entities within its boundaries, the fears are nonetheless real ones. Since the U.S. is by
far the largest investing country, the political as well as the economic impact of MNC operations appears different, depending
whether it is seen from a U.S. or foreign viewpoint.
14. Id. at 534-46.
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The ForeignPerspective
Foreign governments perceive dangers in U.S.-owned MNCs because of:
-their very size;
-popular "gut" feelings that key domestic industries should be
in indigenous hands;
-possible interference by the MNC with domestic policies or
avoidance of national planning and regulations; and
-their possible use by the U.S. government as a channel for
interference.

Size
It is estimated that the United States supplies roughly one-half
of the world's foreign direct investment and U.S. foreign investors

have been hyperbolically characterized as the "world's third greatest power." In Canada during the 1960's, U.S.-controlled companies
accounted for about 60 percent of that country's total output of
manufactures, which prompted a remark by Prime Mlinister Trudeau about the dangers of sleeping next to an elephant.' 5 In Europe, the U.S.-owned share of the economies is much smaller.

Here tensions are generated when U.S.-controlled MNCs take over
established industries, and concentrate in the advanced sectors
of the economy. Developing countries, too, worry about the large
size of MNCs (not just American) in relation to their fledgling
economies.
Gut Feelings
Appeals to national identity and prestige, security, mercantilist
economics, ideology, culture, or a combination of these tap the same
wellspring of feeling. It follows that it may be politically, even if
not economically, desirable to have at least certain sectors of the
economy under indigenous control. The development of the AngloFrench "Concorde" is an example of a reaction to U.S. dominance
in this high-technology area based largely on prestige, and possibly on national security considerations. These are reactions to
MNCs most common in the developed world.
15. Rolfe, The International Corporation in Perspective, THE MuLT=nA-

TIONAL CORPORATION IN =x WORLD EcoNomy 30 (1970).

The threat to national culture straddles the developed and the
developing worlds. As a leading edge of modernization, MNCs can
bring painful disruptions to traditional LDC cultures, as well as
a perceived vulgarization of the cultures of developed countries
("la cocacolonisation de France"). The fear that American MNCs
will not follow local practices in hiring, firing and operating may
also raise concerns.
An ideological objection to MNCs is encountered in Eastern Europe and some LDCs. Growing pragmatism and the need for advanced technology may temper the resistance in Eastern Europe to
the entrance of MNCs. Marxian ideology will still play an important role, however, in the form and extent of their operations.
rnterference with Domestic Policies
The capability of MNCs to open or close plants in a particular
country, manipulate intra-enterprise transfer prices, use differential lags in payments between subsidiaries, and restrict affiliate exports is viewed with concern by national policy makers. A Canadian Government Task Force on the Structure of Canadian Industry, for example, found that the "tendency inherent in direct
investment to shift decision-making power in the private sector
outside Canada, has, on occasion, posed serious problems for those
formulating Canadian policy .... ,, Similarly, in France there

was concern that the access of American MNCs to capital outside
that country enabled those firms to escape the controls of the
planning authorities. 17
The ability of MNCs to avoid national economic controls should
not be exaggerated. There are real limits to the extent that transfer prices and intra-firm payments can be manipulated in a country with reasonably efficient and honest tax and customs bureaucracies. More importantly, given the possibilities for control open
to a host government, ranging from legal penalties to subtle discrimination and even outright expropriation, an MNC is likely to
be very cautious about defying important national economic policies.
The potential for MNC interference with domestic policies in developing countries may be somewhat greater than in countries
such as France or the United Kingdom, yet even in the LDCs it is
certainly less than it was a generation ago. With respect to the
16. BEHRMAN, NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THE MULTINATIONAL

6 (1970).
17. IOxND

ERmER,

AWERIcAN BusINEss ABRoAD 81-83 (1969).

ENTERPRISE
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allegations against ITT in Chile, it should be noted that regardless
of what may have been considered, the company apparently did
not in fact carry out any plan to disrupt the local economy.',
On the other hand, the very flexibility of the IV[NC allows it to
be particularly responsive at times to national policies. In some
instances, footloose U.S.-owned M.NCs have been more easily able
to respond to host government incentives to invest in depressed
regions than established local firms. This appears to have been
the case in Italy's Mezzogiorno and the Massif Central region of
France.19
Channel for Interference by the U.S. Government
Although a number of MNCs may have developed a global perspective economically and commercially, most of them are still
basically national in their political outlook. MNCs still rely on
the government of the parent company to provide protection
against what they consider to be unjust acts of host governments.
In return, foreign investors willingly or unwillingly may, on occasion, become an instrument of the home country in the extraterritorial application of its economic policy. In the past, attempted
application of our trading-with-the-enemy legislation to U.S.owned subsidiaries in several countries which were doing business
with Cuba and the People's Republic of China, resulted in considerable ill feeling, although the economic magnitudes involved
were quite small. A different but related problem with France
was caused by a 1964 U.S. government decision to forbid IBM
of its advanced computer equipment to its French
to export some
20
subsidiary.
The application of our antitrust laws has also led to complaints
by other governments that the U.S. government was interfering in
their domestic affairs. Other examples of governmental interference include direct U.S. investment controls, and pressures to
speed up remittance of earnings. So important are U.S. direct investment funds to Canada that fears that the flow of American capital to our northern neighbor would be restricted touched off a run
18. Benoit, The Attack on the Multinationals, 7
Bus. 21 (1972).
19. VERNON, supra note 8 at 244.

20. Id. at 235-36.

CoLum. J.

OF

WoRLD

on the Canadian dollar in the late 1960's, even though
Canada was
21
in a strong balance of payments position at the time.
In theory, there is no reason why the foreign subsidiary of an
MNC cannot transmit host country pressures and policies to the
United States. In practice, however, the country in which the
MNC's management and/or the largest proportion of its assets are
located is probably able to exert the greatest pressure on the
company's policies.
The U.S. Perspective
From the earliest days of the Republic, the United States has
maintained a policy of welcoming foreign investment. A combination of our dedication to the free enterprise system, our role as
pacesetters in modernization, and our pluralistic society embodying traditions from many countries, all have deterred the spread of
a view of foreign investors as threats to ideology, traditional values or national identity. It would be interesting, for example, to
know how many Americans are aware, or indeed would care, that
Shell Oil is a foreign-owned firm. Whether this tolerance would
persist in the face of truly large-scale or highly visible investment
is open to some question. At present, public concern has concentrated on the economic effects of American MNC operations abroad
(e.g. charges of job exportation), rather than political ones.
While its importance thus should not be exaggerated, prejudice
against foreigners is nevertheless an obstacle to FDI in the United
States. The concentration of foreign ownership in certain areas or
sectors of the economy can create resentments here not unlike
those sometimes experienced by American investors abroad. The
rapid growth of Japanese investment in Hawaii and on the West
Coast has been viewed with a certain uneasiness by the local populace and has prompted expressions of concern to legislators and
government departments.
Distrust of foreign influence in the U.S. economy is also seen in
a bill (H.R. 8951) submitted to the House of Representatives in
June, 1973, by Congressmen John Dent and Joseph Gaydos, both
from the Pittsburgh area. This proposal, to which observers give
little chance of passage, would prevent non-U.S. citizens from acquiring more than 35 percent of the non-voting securities, or more
than 5 percent of the voting securities, of any company registered
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
21. Krause, Recent InternationalMonetary Crises: Causes and Cures, in
PoLIcy 556-60

READINGS 3N MON EY, NATIOTAL, INcOumE AND STABILIZATION

(1970).
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HOST COUNTRY INVESTMENT POLICIES

The economic and political effects of FDI discussed above, or,
perhaps more accurately, the perception of these effects by policymaking officials, are important determinants of national foreign
investment policies. While many governments appear to acknowledge at least potential economic benefits from FDI there are considerable mIsgivings with regard to its political impact. These
doubts and other domestic political considerations are resulting in
increased regulation of FDI by a number of developed as well as
22
developing countries.
Developed Countries
In developed countries, restrictions on FDI generally take the
form of regulations in the sensitive area of takeovers of domestically-owned businesses and the exclusion of FDI from sectors
such as banking and communications. Foreign ownership of the
economy has become a national political issue in Australia and
Canada. Late in 1972, Australia instituted an advance screening requirement for foreign takeovers of locally-owned firms of $1 million (Australian) or more. The screening is to determine whether
the foreign investment will bring net benefit to Australia with
respect to prices, quality or range of products, and technology sufficient to justify increased foreign control of a particular industry.
The new Labor government in Australia came to power in December, 1972, with a platform calling for greater Australian ownership
of Australian resources, although to date this has not been translated into specific programs. In Canada, where two government
commissions have investigated the impact of FDI, particularly from
the U.S., Parliament is considering a Foreign Investment Review
Act, which would require official review of foreign takeovers of
Canadian firms 'and perhaps could be extended to new investments
later.
The European Community (EC) has not formulated a common
policy on FDI, and most questions are handled directly by the nine
member governments. The emerging EC programs on anti22. For a detailed survey of host country investment restrictions and

regulations see King, Foreign Restrictions on U.S. Investment, 11 SAN
DIEGO L, Rev. 27 (1973),

trust policy, regional development, and common industrial policy
will all have important implications for U.S. FDI. As presently
formulated, the EC industrial policy would accord properly registered European subsidiaries of U.S.-owned firms treatment equal
to that of national firms of the member states. France, on occasion, has asserted that firms granted the same treatment as national firms of member states should have their decision-making
centered in Europe (and not the home country). It remains to be
seen to what extent EC policies will in fact favor European industry at the expense of U.S. foreign investment.
Attitudes toward FDI among the nine members of the EC vary
considerably. Ireland actively seeks FDI and offers tax incentives
to attract it. France, while host to considerable FDI (including
U.S. investment of over $3 billion), has on several occasions opposed takeovers of prestigious or high technology national industries. The other major European countries generally have welcomed FDI, and indeed have encouraged it in hopes of furthering
regional development programs. In several countries, however,
there have been indications of increasing sensitivity with regard to
takeovers.
While still more restrictive to FDI than the United States or
most European countries, Japan, following a good deal of urging
by its Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) partners announced a new and significantly liberalized
system of FDI regulation earlier this year to permit 100 percent
foreign ownership of new investments in most sectors. Heretofore, Japan had limited most foreign investors to minority participation in joint ventures with Japanese firms.
All told, the actions taken by developed countries strengthen
their ability to determine whether specific foreign investments
are consistent with fundamental national interests. These policies do not promise to reduce capital and technology flows among
the industrialized countries. On the contrary, as Japan's recent
liberalized investment policies take effect and as the depreciation
of the dollar makes the United States increasingly attractive for
inward direct investment, long-term capital flows between the developed countries may well continue to grow.
Developing Countries
The policies of developing countries toward FDI range from active recruitment to complete rejection. Among the factors influencing an LDC's attitude toward FDI are its socio-political orientation and its resource endowment. As a group, the LDCs probably have less confidence with regard to the potential benefits of
14
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FDI, which reflects their historical experience with FDI and the
paucity of foreign investors based in the developing world.
Few developing nations place no significant restrictions on foreign investment, and a number of LDCs have taken or are contemplating actions to limit it severely. Not content with restrictions
on new projects, several LDCs have resorted to expropriation or
forced divestiture of existing investments, particularly in the extractive, financial and public utility sectors. Some of these developments reflect domestic political considerations, such as the major
reorientation of governmental policies which took place in Chile
following the election of President Salvador Allende. Others have
specific economic objectives, such as attempts to channel foreign
investment into export industries, to shield domestic entrepreneurs
from foreign competition, and to obtain a greater share of oligopolistic profits.
The following examples are indicative of the types of limitations
which LDCs are placing on FDI:
The Andean Pact
Through a series of decisions made in 1970 and 1971, this group
of South American countries (Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,
Peru, and soon to be joined by Venezuela) agreed on a foreign investment code which would place FDI under tightened host country control. The code provides that in order to receive the trade
liberalization benefits of the Pact, existing foreign-owned firms
must divest themselves of sufficient equity over a 15 to 20 year
period to bring local ownership of each investment up to at least 51
percent. Foreign investors contemplating new projects in these
countries must agree ab initio to similar phased disinvestment.
The code permits Pact members to impose even stricter conditions
on FDI than those required by the code. Some members of the
Pact, notably Chile, Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia have done so and
have expropriated a number of foreign-owned firms.
The Andean investment code has influenced proposed foreign investment restrictions in Mexico and Argentina. A number of other
countries, including Morocco, Ghana, the Philippines, and Thailand
have recently announced decrees which will require a changeover
to majority domestic ownership of investments in specified sectors

of their economies,

OPEC Nations
The eleven members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya,
Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela) have joined together
in a concerted effort to improve their share of the economic benefits from FDI vis-a-vis the foreign-owned international oil companies. While OPEC members have received increasingly favorable
terms for new petroleum concessions over the years as a result of
nationalistic pressures, major existing concessions for the most part
remained relatively unchanged until 1972. Last year, Saudi Arabia
and the Persian Gulf states, capitalizing on their position 'as holders of the world's largest known petroleum reserves, demanded and
obtained equity participation in the producing activities of the concessionary companies. The agreements negotiated provided for immediate 25 percent ownership by the host government which will
rise to 51 percent in 1982. Negotiations are underway with other
OPEC members and are expected to result in agreements at least
as favorable to the host governments. Direct expropriations of
foreign oil companies recently have taken place in both Iraq and
Libya. In the latter case, the motivation appears to have been to
put pressure on the other companies to come to terms and to affect
U.S. foreign policy.
The effects of imposing restrictions on FDI of the types discussed are likely to be mixed. In some cases they may stimulate
local entrepreneurship, savings, investment, and the development
of local capital markets. On the other hand, even selective restrictions may bring about a worsened climate for and net reduction
in FDI of all types; divert scarce resources away from 'areas, such
as social infrastructure, which may be less suitable for FDI; and
result in an undesirable redistribution of income in favor of domestic capital. When countries resort to uncompensated expropriation, or to discriminatory treatment of FDI already in place, the
problems can become escalated into intergovernmental disputes.
In spite of the above, opportunities for mutually profitable business relationships may continue to exist for foreign entrepreneurs
ieven in countries with significant restrictions on FDI. Frequently,
the key for the businessman in unlocking these opportunities and
for the host government in avoiding a worsened investment climate is the use of new forms of investment such as joint ventures,
scheduled renegotiation of contracts, use of buffer institutions for
financing, phased disinvestment, and various types of cooperative
ventures not involving equity ownership. As long 'as profit-making opportunities and reasonable stability as to the "rules of the
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game" exist, businessmen increasingly appear to be finding the
form of their activity to be of secondary importance. Evidence of
this can be found in the growing numbers of U.S. and Western European businessmen doing business in the Socialist states, all of
which either prohibit, or at a minimum place tight restrictions on,
FDI.
INERxATONAL IN:iATIVmS ow

FDI

Parallel to the attention being given to FDI by national governments, an interest has developed in a number of international
organizations. The developing nations-which look at investment issues almost exclusively from the perspective of FDI
hosts--want international consideration of the impact of MINCs on
their economies and national autonomy. The LDCs have been in
the forefront in sponsoring studies of MNCs in several United
Nations bodies. These include a United Nations Economic and
Social Council (ECOSOC) study on the impact of MNCs on economic development; a United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) investigation of restrictive business
practices, including those associated with MNC activities, which
may affect LDC trade and development; and work by the International Labor Organization (ILO) on the relationship of MNCs
to domestic social policies. All of these studies are still in progress
and have not as yet produced any concrete policy recommendations.
While cooperating with these efforts, the developed countriesmost of which are senders as well as receivers of FDI-appear to
be more interested in seeking to identify possible areas of common
interest in the investment field. The objective is to try to achieve
a consensus which will permit the continued flow of capital and
technology, with presumed economic benefits, and establish at least
some agreed-upon limits regarding national policies to either encourage or restrict FDI. As a result, most of the developed countries, including the United States, have looked principally to the
OECD for multilateral discussion of FDI issues. At present,
the focal point for OECD activity on FDI is the high-level Executive Committee in Special Session which has recently agreed that
proposals should be considered for setting up consultation procedures based on guidelines in matters concerning international investment and the activities of MNCs. Several other OECD com-

mittees are also examining specialized FDI-related matters. The
Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices, for example, is currently considering the feasibility of developing a code
of behavior for MNCs.
U.S. GOVERIIMENT FOREIGN INVESTMENT POLICIES

The basic tenet underlying U.S. foreign investment policy is adherence to the principles that entrepreneurs should be free to respond to market forces, and that government should follow a policy which is basically neutral with respect to FDI. Overall U.S.
policy reflects a belief that the economic and political impact of
FDI is beneficial to the United States and our foreign relations.
The United States government has generally sought to reduce national impediments-including our own-to the free flow of FDI.
In furthering this objective, we have supported liberalization of the
OECD Capital Movements Code and the international convertibility of currencies; we have entered into a network of bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation or of amity and economic relations to secure national treatment for American foreign
investors; and through our tax laws and bilateral tax treaties with
other countries, we have aimed at having foreign investment income receive neither privileged nor discriminatory treatment.
Despite the general presumption in favor of letting market forces
determine investment flows, a number of specific U.S. government
policies are exceptions to this rule, some encouraging FDI, others
serving to restrict it. These non-neutral policies have come about
as the result of ad hoc responses to particular international -economic problems, tradeoffs between foreign and domestic economic
policy goals, and the influence of non-economic national interests.
Probably the most significant departure from neutrality on the
restrictive side is the program of controls over direct investment
outflows, voluntary at first and mandatory since 1968, which came
about as a response to U.S. balance of payments problems. While
the present Administration is committed to ending all remaining
controls over FDI by the end of 1974, there is some sentiment in
the United States-as evidenced by certain provisions of the BurkeHartke trade bill-for the enactment of significantly tighter
restrictions than presently exist on FDI outflows. The BurkeHartke bill has received considerable publicity, but there appears
to be little likelihood of its being adopted, at least in its present
form. It is even more unlikely that the United States will reverse
its traditional policy of welcoming inward FDI, although in light
of the sensitivities noted earlier, there may be some domestic pres-
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sures for discouraging the concentration of FDI in certain sectors
or areas.
Other U.S. policies may, or definitely do, encourage FDI. While
the proclaimed goal of our fiscal policy is neutrality with regard
to whether income is earned either at home or abroad, a number of
economists believe that certain provisions of our tax laws, notably
the deferral of U.S. tax on the income of foreign subsidiaries of
American firms until it is repatriated, actually work to encourage
foreign investment. The present Administration has recently proposed elimination of the tax deferral on new FDI where the U.S.
entrepreneur goes abroad to take advantage of host country tax
incentives or to serve the U.S. market by producing in foreign
countries with low corporate income taxes. It has not been proposed, however, to eliminate the tax deferral itself.
The U.S. government actively encourages FDI in those LDCs
which seek it. This policy, which is a cornerstone of U.S. policy
towards the developing world, is based on the assumption that FDI
is a vital contributing factor in the development process and, as
such, a necessary complement to official assistance flows. The
President's policy statement on "Economic Assistance and Investment Security in Developing Nations" of January 19, 1972, described
the link between investment and development in the following
way:
A sort of symbiosis exists-with government aid efforts not only
speeding the flow of, but actually depending for their success upon,
private capital, both domestic and foreign.
Specifically, the U.S. government provides incentives for investing in LDCs by means of the investment insurance and financing programs of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC), general exemption of the developing countries from the
FDI controls program, and preferential tax treatment. By serving
to reduce political risks, OPIC insurance may stimulate the flow
of some U.S. investment to LDCs which, absent insurance, would
not otherwise go there.
Closely related to the U.S. government policy of encouraging
FDI for developmental purposes is the policy of attempting to
provide security for that investment once in place. Diplomatic efforts to protect the property of one's citizens from what are regarded as arbitrary acts of other governments have venerable roots

in international law and in U.S. usage. The United States respects
the right of other governments to take American-owned private
property provided that such actions 'are non-discriminatory, for
public purposes, and that the owners of the property receive
prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. Since U.S. foreign
investment policy is based on a general presumption that FDI
benefits both the receiving as well as the sending country, it calls
into question the economic wisdom of expropriatory acts.
The Presidential policy statement already referred to states that
when a country expropriates a significant U.S. interest without
making reasonable provision for compensation, it should be presumed that the U.S. government will neither extend new bilateral
economic benefits to the expropriating country, nor support loans
to that country by international development banks
...unless and until it is determined that the country is taking
reasonable steps to provide adequate compensation or that there
are major factors affecting U.S. interests [humanitarian relief efforts, for example] which require continuance of all or part of
these benefits.
The same considerations are reflected in the Hickenlooper
Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act and the Gonzalez Amendments to legislation authorizing U.S. contributions to the multilateral lending institutions. These provisions of law do not explicitly give the President discretionary authority to take into consideration other major factors affecting U.S. interests. 23 Accordingly,
a potential for conflict exists between the terms of the President's
policy statement and the requirements of legislation. As a practical matter, however, it has thus far been possible to avoid this
problem.
THE INTERACTION OF NATIONAL FOREIGN INVESTMENT POLICIES

The foreign investment policies of the United States and other
nations sometimes mesh and sometimes clash. Most developed
countries have adopted policies which are consistent with a reasonably free international flow of capital and technology. As a
result, major disputes with these countries over American FDI
have been largely avoided. The occasional disputes with France
on investment-related matters are one notable exception, and new
23. As this article is being written (October 1973) it appears that the
1973 Foreign Assistance Bill may emerge from the Senate-House Conference Committee with a provision regarding the expropriation of American
property which is more explicitly consistent with the language of the
President's policy statement. This would not affect the Gonzalez Amendments, however.
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regimens for FDI in Australia and possibly Canada may be cause
for some concern in the future.
While American FDI continues to grow in the developing world,
investment-related foreign relations problems seem to be increasing at least as rapidly. United States government policies to encourage FDI, and then to protect it once in place, can conflict, and
have done so, with LDC policies aimed at restricting foreign investment. Take the following, unfortunately not hypothetical, example:
The U.S. government, consistent with its commitment to LDC
development, encourages American FDI in a particular country
thought to have a favorable climate for foreign investment. Then,
as the result of a change in government, the socio-political orientation of that government undergoes a major change. The new
government adopts policies greatly reducing the role of FDI in the
economy, which give rise to disputes over compensation with the
foreign investors whose property is being taken. This, in turn,
calls into play U.S. policies to protect the rights of our investors
overseas. These policies grate on LDC sensitivities as has been
particularly evident in Latin America. The result: where the
U.S. government once sought to aid the country's development
by encouraging FDI, it now finds that our investment security
policy demands serious consideration of halting bilateral assistance
flows, and possibly requires, by law, automatic opposition to new
multilateral lending to that country. Ironically, FDI, the presumed agent of constructive international economic relations, can,
on occasion, become a major source of tension between the United
States and other countries.
SoNvM QUESTIONS FOR CURR ENT PoLIcY

It is appropriate to conclude with a mention of some of the implications of U.S. foreign investment policy. Four questions suggest themselves:
First, should the United States continue to press vigorously for
further relaxation of national restrictions on FDI? While undoubtedly desirable from a strictly economic viewpoint, such a course of
action could be counterproductive politically, given the evidence of
considerable and apparently increasing misgivings regarding FDI

on the part of a number of developing and some developed nations.
A more realistic policy, under present circumstances, might well be
to concentrate on persuading the developed countries to comply
more fully with the provisions for liberalizing capital movements
already agreed to, and the LDCs to recognize that maintaining
relatively stable, consistent policies toward FDI can help to improve
a country's investment climate and avoid intergovernmental disputes. In view of American concerns about "runaway industries,"
there may be domestic political pressures for not pushing ahead too
quickly in the area of liberalizing national foreign investment
policies. At the same time, we should continue to point out, at
home and abroad, the economic benefits which can be derived from
FDI, and continue to base our overall foreign investment policy
on a belief that market forces should be the primary mechanism for
determining investment flows.
Second, should the United States still encourage FDI in developing countries? Current U.S. policies probably do mean some net
increase in the flow of FDI to the developing world and tend to
improve the competitive position of American business abroad. It
is not clear, however, how much additional investment is thereby
generated, and since the principal incentive, OPIC programs, is
not available in all LDCs, the main effect of the incentives may be
the distribution of FDI among, rather than on the amount allocated
to, the developing nations. It is entirely possible that an appropriate
amount of FDI would take place in the absence of incentives as a
result of market forces. Likewise, it has not been established that
U.S. firms would not be able to compete effectively without OPICtype programs, or that OPIC plays a significant role in defusing
or resolving investment disputes. Of course, there may be some
instances where the existence of incentives is crucial to a decision
on whether or not to invest. Only where that is the case and
where specific national interests, such as developing sources of
scarce raw materials, are demonstrable does direct U.S. governmental encouragement of FDI appear to be justified.
Third, is current U.S. policy of seeking to protect our existing
investments abroad, including the threat of withholding economic
benefits, really effective and consistent with our overall foreign
policy interests? Given the strong American tradition of protecting the rights of our citizens, it is most improbable that the
United States government could accept a Calvo Doctrine-type policy of giving up the right to make diplomatic representations on
behalf of its firms. Yet, it must be recognized that there are real
limits to the effectiveness of a policy which relies to a considerable
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extent on a threat of sanctions. Withholding economic benefits is
not effective where there is no foreign aid program, nor is voting
against a loan in an international development bank effective if
the United States is isolated in its position and our support is not
required for approval. Such policies work only where there is
some available leverage and as a result, there is a danger of being
able only "to hurt the ones you love." Yet, the U.S. government
can hardly fail to respond to expropriatory acts by other governments. On occasion, American firms have indicated that U.S. governmental involvement in an investment dispute has been helpful.
Even in such cases, however, we do not always know the extent
to which our success was based on market forces, the threat of
sanctions, the use of our "good offices," the presence or absence
of OPIC, the desire of the other country to maintain good relations, or a combination of these factors.
Since expropriations are undertaken for domestic political, social, and cultural motives, as well as for economic reasons, the
threatened or actual loss of economic benefits may well only be a
secondary consideration in the eyes of the expropriating country.
Consequently, an expropriation policy relying to a significant extent on the threat of sanctions may only serve, in some cases, to
exacerbate already difficult situations. In addition, American businessmen, the supposed principal beneficiaries of our investment seand Goncurity policy, have voiced concerns that the Hickenlooper
24
interests.
their
to
damaging
be
can
Amendments
zalez
The foregoing illustrates the desirability of following an expropriation policy, which includes possible withholding of economic
benefits, but which allows for careful consideration of the likely effectiveness of sanctions before applying or threatening to apply
them. Such a policy would require the repeal or significant liberalization of the Hickenlooper and Gonzalez Amendments, and a
most judicious implementation of the President's 1972 policy
statement on investment security.
Finally, what are the prospects for international regulation of
FDI? Do, in fact, the operations of IVINCs seriously threaten the
existence of the nation state as suggested by the title of Raymond
Vernon's book, SOVEMIGNTY AT BAY? On the contrary, increased
24. Swansbrough, The American Investor's View on Latin American

Economic Nationalism, 26 IxTER-AmmucAN EcONolvnc AFFAnRs 72-78 (1967).

national restriction of FDI and the skeptical attitudes of many
LDCs and even some developed countries toward it may well indicate that the MNCs are the ones at bay. Nation states have shown
a remarkable viability and vitality. Stephen Hymer and Robert
Rowthorn have implied that if one were to bet on the relative
staying power of France and General Motors, the smart money
would be on France. 2 5 Given this situation, it is probably realistic
to assume that for the present, control over FDI will continue to
be exercised primarily at a national, or, in some cases (e.g., the
European Community), a regional level. Nevertheless, it may be
possible, among the developed countries at least, to achieve some
agreed guidelines on permissible limits of national policies which
affect FDL The OECD has made some tentative steps in this direction, and these should be encouraged. The working out of 'a
common policy in the sensitive area of takeovers, which has been
suggested by former Assistant Secretary of State Anthony Solo26
mon, could be particularly useful.

Between the developed countries and the LDCs there appears to
be even less likelihood of achieving any significant international
agreement on foreign investment policies. While the studies on
MNCs under way in the various United Nations agencies may produce new information and provide a forum for exchanging opinions, agreement on anything like a "GATT for investment" does
not appear to be in the cards anytime soon.
This analysis should not be interpreted as reflecting pessimism
as to the future of FDI. This writer has very little doubt that FDT
by MNCs will continue to increase in the coming years. At the
same time, the growth of FDI will increase its potential foreign
affairs impact. Modifying U.S. government foreign investment
policies along lines suggested could reduce the chances of FDI having negative effects on our foreign relations, and help insure that
the foreign investment activities of American MNCs continue to
play a positive role in the world economy.

25. 1-ymer and Rowthorn, Multinational Corporations and International
Oligopoly: The Non-American Challenge, in THE IwTEmRATioNAL CoRPoRAiox 88-9 (1970).
26. Solomon, International Trade and Multinational Companies: The
Question of International Control, an unpublished paper presented at a
conference on "Problems of the International Control of Investment" held
at Dusseldorf, Germany, January 5-6, 1973, under the sponsorship of
Georgetown University and Frankfurt University.

TABLE I
Growth in Trade, GNP, and Foreign Investment
of Industrial Countries, 1950 to 1970
(in billions of dollars)
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TABLE II
Growth of U.S. Direct Investments Abroad,
by Area and Industry 1929-1970"
Percent of
Amount in Billion
Dollars
Total
1950
1970**
1929 1950 1970** 1929
All Areas, Total
Canada
Latin America
Europe
Middle East & Africa
Other Areas
Developed Countries, Total
Less Dev. Countries, Total
International, Unallocated
All Industries, Total

_

Mining and Smelting
Petroleum
Manufacturing
Other
_
Notes:

_

-

7.5
2.0
3.5
1.4
0.1
0.5

11.8
3.6
4.6
1.7
1.0
0.9

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

100.0
78.1
26.7
22.8
46.7
14.7
24.5*** 18.7
1.3
5.1
6.6
11.0

100.0
30.5
39.0
14.4
8.5
7.6

100.0
29.2
18.8
31.4
6.5
14.1

53.1
21.4
3.6

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

68.0
27.4
4.6

7.5

11.8

78.1

100.0

100.0

100.0

1.2
1.1
1.8
3.4

1.1
3.4
3.8
3.5

6.1
21.8
32.2
17.9

16.0
14.7
24.0
45.3

9.3
28.8
32.2
29.7

7.8
27.9
41.2
23.0

Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.
* Book value at year/end
** Preliminary
*** Excludes Eastern Europe
n.a.
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